The respondent is ineligible for cancellation of removal because his actions and involvement with a smuggler to bring his child to the United States constitute assisting or aiding an “alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law” under section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § ‍1182(a)(6)(E)(i), triggering the good moral character bar under section 101(f)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § ‍1101(f)(3).

(1) If an alien fails to pay the annual asylum fee within the prescribed deadline, the alien’s asylum application should be pretermitted or deemed abandoned.

(2) The annual asylum fee and consequences for not paying it do not extend to an application for statutory withholding of removal or a request for protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture.

(1) The respondent did not demonstrate that he could establish the extreme hardship to a qualifying relative required for a section 212(h) waiver, let alone the higher standard of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.

(2) The respondent did not demonstrate that he would warrant a favorable exercise of discretion for a waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status where his equities regarding his family relationships are outweighed by significant adverse factors, including his convictions for sexual crimes.

(1) The Immigration Judge clearly erred in finding it more likely than not the applicant will be tortured if removed to either Mexico or Guatemala based on general country conditions evidence and expert witness testimony about corruption while overlooking key facts regarding the applicant’s individualized circumstances, including lack of past torture, the passage of time since the applicant received threats, and the vague and indirect nature of the threats.

(2) The applicant did not establish that a public official is likely to acquiesce to his torture by gang members where the record shows elements within the government have taken action to combat criminal organizations, even if such efforts have not been effective.

(1) The applicant, who was found incompetent for purposes of his withholding-only proceedings and was appointed a qualified representative who submitted filings on his behalf, was provided with adequate safeguards to ensure the fairness of his proceedings. 

(2) The Immigration Judge properly concluded that the applicant did not establish a clear probability of future persecution on account of his membership in a mental health-based particular social group because the evidence in the record did not establish a particularized risk of future persecution.

(1)  The respondent’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of title 35, section 780-113(a)(30) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes is for a particularly serious crime rendering her statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.

(2)  The respondent did not establish eligibility for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture where past mistreatment in Jamaica based on her sexual orientation was inflicted by private individuals and she did not demonstrate that a public official would likely acquiesce to any torture.

(1)  Reconsideration is not warranted where the respondent has not shown error in the Board’s determination that the Immigration Judge properly required corroboration of credible but unpersuasive testimony and properly found that corroboration of an alleged forced abortion in China was reasonably available.

(2)  The respondent did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because it was not unreasonable for counsel to rely on a certified translation of evidence that was submitted by the respondent’s prior counsel.

(1) The respondent’s conviction for health care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347 is for a particularly serious crime.

(2) Given the absence of any direct encounters with the criminals the respondent fears, insufficient evidence that his relatives or employees have been targets of kidnapping, and the respondent’s ability to relocate within Nigeria, the Immigration Judge permissibly found that it is not more likely than not the respondent will be tortured.

(1)  The group “Mexican men with Schizoaffective Disorder,” defined only by such diagnosis, is not cognizable as a particular social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

(2)  A series of speculative occurrences that also lack evidence of persecutory intent is insufficient to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution.

(1) The proposed particular social group defined as "married Mexican women who are unable to leave their relationship" is not cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act because it is circularly defined and lacks particularity.

(2) The existence of a lawful marriage cannot be presumed simply because two persons are cohabitating or have children in common.

(1) The Secretary of State’s letter that the respondent’s presence in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences is presumptive and sufficient evidence that the respondent is removable under section 237(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) (2024).

(2) The respondent’s failure to disclose his involvement with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees on his Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, constitutes a material misrepresentation rendering him removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A).

(3) The Immigration Judge properly denied the respondent’s application for a waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), where equities in his case were outweighed by the negative factors, including the Secretary of State’s letter that the respondent’s presence in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences.

(1) “[A]n offense relating to obstruction of justice” under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2024), is a specific intent offense involving an affirmative and intentional attempt to interfere with the process of justice and law. Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838 (BIA 2012), reaffirmed.

(2) A conviction for accessory to a felony under section 32 of the California Penal Code that results in a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year categorically qualifies as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).

(1) The respondent's children are no longer qualifying relatives for purposes of the respondent's application for cancellation of removal because they are now over 21 years old and have therefore aged out.

(2) The respondent has not demonstrated that the economic detriment, diminished educational opportunities, and emotional hardship his children may experience in the event of the respondent's removal from the United States would constitute exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.

(1) If a respondent demonstrates past persecution, there is a presumption of a future threat to life or freedom on the basis of the original claim, but this presumption may be rebutted if there has been a fundamental change in circumstance such that the respondent’s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of a protected ground.

(2) Where a presumption of a future threat to life or freedom applies, an Immigration Judge cannot rely on generalized crime and widespread violence unrelated to the original claim to find the presumption has not been rebutted, particularly where other evidence suggests a fundamental change in circumstances such that a respondent will no longer be harmed on account of a protected ground.

(3) The respondent’s conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Access Device Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2) (2018) constitutes a particularly serious crime rendering her statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal.

(1) When a U nonimmigrant visa is not immediately available to a respondent and the record does not establish that one is likely to be available in the reasonably near future, administrative closure over the Department of Homeland Security’s objection is inappropriate.

(2) The Board’s statement in Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 96, 99 (BIA 2025), that administrative closure is only appropriate for “a reasonably short period of time” applies in the context of both the initial decision to administratively close a case and the decision to recalendar a case.

(3) The Board and Immigration Judges have no authority to use administrative closure as a de facto extra-statutory form of relief that effectively grants amnesty to thousands of removable aliens because they may be eligible for a visa sometime in the future.

(1) The unique barriers to reporting harm faced by children do not apply to adults, including adults who suffered harm as children. Matter of C-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 740 (BIA 2023), clarified.

(2) Given the size of Russia, the respondent's membership in the country's majority religion, and the insufficient evidence demonstrating her family maintains an interest in locating her more than 2 years after they last threatened her, the Immigration Judge's finding that the respondent could not reasonably relocate to avoid persecution is clearly erroneous.

(1) The respondent willfully misrepresented a material fact by omitting reference to his military service during the Bosnian War on his refugee application because the omission cut off a line of inquiry that predictably would have disclosed facts relevant to his eligibility for refugee status.

(2) The respondent did not warrant a discretionary grant of a fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2024), based on his repeated and long-term misrepresentations regarding his military service during the Bosnian War and his lack of remorse.

(1) If the Department of Homeland Security claims that an asylum cooperative agreement bars a respondent from applying for asylum in the United States, the Immigration Judge should determine whether the safe third country bar applies prior to and separate from considering a respondent’s eligibility for asylum.

(2) A respondent subject to the terms of an asylum cooperative agreement has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she will more likely than not be persecuted on account of a protected ground or tortured in the relevant third country to avoid application of the safe third country bar and for the respondent to be eligible to seek asylum and other protection claims in the United States.

(1) Perceived or imputed membership in a proposed particular social group will only satisfy the particular social group requirements if the underlying group of which the respondent is perceived to be a member is, standing alone, sufficiently cognizable.

(2) The respondent's proposed particular social group, defined as "perceived Salvadoran gang members," is not cognizable within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008), reaffirmed.

(1) Because Immigration Judges and the Board have a duty to promptly and fairly bring removal proceedings to a close, whether there are persuasive reasons for a case to proceed and be resolved on the merits is the primary consideration in determining whether administrative closure is appropriate under the totality of the circumstances. Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), reaffirmed.

(2) A pending application for Temporary Protected Status generally will not warrant a grant of administrative closure.

(1) An applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2018), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018).

(2) An alien detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), who is released from detention pursuant to a grant of parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2018), and whose grant of parole is subsequently terminated, is returned to custody under section 235(b) pending the completion of removal proceedings.

(1) Electronic notification of a briefing schedule sent to the email address of record is sufficient notice in a case eligible for electronic filing, regardless of whether an alien's attorney or accredited representative opens the email or accesses the document via the Executive Office for Immigration Review's Courts and Appeals ("ECAS") Case Portal.

(2) A rebuttable presumption of delivery applies when a party has been sent electronic notification of a briefing schedule through the procedures provided for in the ECAS regulations, but this presumption is weaker than the presumption that applies to documents sent by certified mail because electronic service through ECAS does not involve the use of a signed receipt or other affirmative evidence of delivery.

(1) An Immigration Judge is not required to consider an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589) on the merits if it is incomplete, and incomplete applications may be considered waived or abandoned, particularly where an opportunity to cure has been offered.

(2) Because declarations are not a constituent part of an asylum application, a Form I-589 is not incomplete, and an Immigration Judge may not deem it abandoned, solely because the respondent did not submit a declaration. Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 2010), reaffirmed.

(1) Proximity in time is necessary but not sufficient to conclude that two crimes arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2018). Matter of Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506, 509 (BIA 1992), clarified.

(2) Two crimes involving moral turpitude, premised on separate turpitudinous acts with different objectives, neither of which was committed in the course of accomplishing the other, constitute separate schemes of criminal misconduct.